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and key macro variables like prices, output and interest rates for ten OECD
countries. We find out that a monetary policy shock lowers real house prices in
all ten countries, where the interest rate shock explains between 12 and 24 per-
cent of the fluctuations in house prices. Impulse responses indicate that house
prices rise after an output shock in nine of ten countries. But we also find ev-
idence that real estate prices have a large impact on these key macroeconomic
variables. We find out that the house price shock is a germane aggregate de-
mand shock because it raises output and prices and leads to increasing money
market rates in all countries. The story behind this finding is that increasing
house prices lead to an increase in households’ net worth which leads to in-
creasing consumption expentitures and thereby stimulates aggregate demand.
This stimulus on aggregate demand leads to increasing output and inflation-
ary pressures on which the central bank reacts by tightening monetary policy.
We find out that 12 to 20 percent of output fluctuations and around 10 to 20
percent of price fluctuations can be traced back to the housing demand shock.
Moreover, we find that these housing demand shocks are a key driver of money
market rates. We conclude that this channel is empirically relevant.
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1 Introduction
The recent months showed that fluctuations in real estate prices can have im-
portant implications for business cycle dynamics and economic stability. De-
spite social aspects like giving shelter housing is also of economic importance.
A large fraction of households’ net worth is invested in housing. Moreover,
housing has the important part to be collateral for mortgage financing. And
a large fraction of private liabilities are mortgages. When real estate prices
change they change households’ credit constraints. If, for example, house prices
increase the value of collateral increases, too. Therefore, financial institutions
have the possibility to lend to people to whom they did not before. Thus,
rising house prices might lead to an increase in credit supply. Increases in real
estate lead to an increase in households’ net worth and thereby pushing the
demand for consumption goods and thereby pushing aggregate demand. It
seems that housing might therefore play a significant role in the transmission
process of monetary policy onto the real economy and also in the transmission
of business cycle fluctuations. If the central bank tightens monetary policy by
raising the federal funds rate, this rise in money market rates will transmit
to the mortgage market. Mortgage rates will thereby increase which expenses
the costs of housing finance, which pulls the demand for housing and thereby
housing prices. This will lower the value of collateral which results in a tight-
ening of the supply of credit, which amplifies the effect of the central bank’s
interest rate hike on other interest rates.
This study analyses the impact of technology shocks, inflation and monetary
policy on house prices as well as the impact of the housing market on the
business cycle, inflation and money market rates by structural vectorautore-
gressions for ten OECD countries. Earlier papers, which study this impact with
different methodologies are Iacoviello (2004), Assenmacher-Wesche and Ger-
lach (2008), Rubio (2008), McQuinn and O’Reilly (2007), Iacoviello (2000),
Iacoviello and Neri (2008), Iacoviello and Minetti (2006), Bharat and Zan
(2002) and Baffoe-Bonnie (1998), Piazzesi et al. (2007), Ja¨ger and Voigtla¨n-
der (2006) and Goodhard and Hofmann (2008). Iaccoviello (2004) derives and
estimates a consumption Euler equation with housing. He assumes that house
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prices are part of the households’ intertemporal optimization problem if the
borrowing capacity of indebted households is assumed to be connected with
the value of their home. By estimating the consumption Euler equation he
finds a strong empirical support for the hypothesis that house prices are a key
driver of aggregate consumption expenditures. Assenmacher-Wesche and Ger-
lach (2008) study the relationship between inflation, output, monetary policy,
residential property and equity prices by means of a panel vectorautoregression
for 17 OECD countries. They find that shocks to asset prices have a significant
effect on output and credit after aproximately one year, where the price level
increases with a larger lag. Rubio (2008) studies the relevance of fixed versus
variable mortgage rates for the business cycle and monetary policy by means
of a stochastic dynamic general equilibrium model with a housing market and
households which are credit constraint and therefore need housing collateral in
order to get loans. Borrowing is allowed either at a variable mortgage rate or
at a fixed rate. She finds out that when monetary policy tightens households
which borrowed at variable mortgage rates reduce consumption expenditures
and housing demand by more than households who borrowed at fixed rates.
McQuinn and O’Reilly (2007) apply country-by-country and panel cointegra-
tion techniques to a panel dataset consiting of 16 OECD countries spanning the
time period from 1980 to 2005. The find a long-run cointegration relationship
between house prices, income and interest rates, which is robust to seven out
of eight cointegration test which they apply. Iacoviello and Neri (2008) explain
the upward trend in real house prices of the last 40 years by slow technological
progress in the housing sector. Moreover, they find that housing demand and
housing supply shocks contribute to 25 percent of the volatility of house prices
and housing investment, while monetary factors contribute with 20 percent.
Iacoviello and Minetti (2006) also state that housing plays an important role in
business cycle dynamics. They name that housing investment is a very volatile
component of aggregate demand as well as that there are important wealth ef-
fects from changes in house prices on consumption. Bharat and Zan (2002)
also find evidence of a stable long-term relationship between house prices, in-
come and interest rates for Sweden and the United Kingdom (UK). By means
of Granger-causality test they find that income Granger-causes house prices in
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Sweden, while they find a feedback from income to house prices as well as a
feedback from house prices to income for the UK. Baffoe-Bonnie (1998) esti-
mates vectorautoregressions and finds that shocks to macroeconomic variables
result in cyclical movements in housing prices. Moreover he finds that the
housing market responds very sensitive to shocks in the employment growth
and the mortgage rate. He concludes that regional house prices reflect regional
employment growth as well as national mortgage rates. Piazzesi and Schneider
(2009) want to explain the observation that in the 1970s U.S. asset markets
experienced a 25 percent decrease in the wealth to GDP ratio and a negative
comovement of house and stock prices that resulted in a portfolio shift from
equity to real estate by 20 percent. They contribute the drop in wealth to the
entry of the baby boom generation into asset markets and to the erosion of bond
portfolios by inflation which resulted in a decreasing propensity to save. Ja¨ger
and Voigtla¨nder (2006) compare the impulse responses of real house prices to
a monetary policy shock within a structural VAR framework for ten OECD
countries. They classify them into three groups. The UK, Spain, Finland and
Australia form group one. These countries are characterized by a mortgage
market which is dominated by mortgage contracts with variable interest rates.
Group two consisting of the USA, the Netherlands and Denmark is charac-
terized by mortgage market where either fixed rate contracts or variable rate
contracts are supplied. Finally, group three consists of Germany, France and
Japan. In these countries there is a dominance of fixed rate contracts in the
mortgage market. Their impulse response analysis indicates that the reaction
of real house prices two years after the monetary policy shock hit the economy
is stronger in the countries with a dominance of variable rate contracts, where
it is weaker in the countries with a dominance of fixed rate contracts. Tsatsa-
ronis and Zhu (2004) use a VAR model consisting of inflation-adjusted house
prices, the growth rate of gross domestic product, the consumer price inflation
rate, the real short-term interest rate, the term spread between a government
bond with long maturity and the short-term interest rate and the growth rate
of inflation adjusted bank credit. They identify inflation as the key driver of
real house prices and that household income has very low explanatary power.
This paper wants to contribute to this literature by supporting the evidence
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that there is a strong link between the housing market and the macroeconomy.
We analyse this link by applying a rigourous econometric analysis to the time
series of real housing prices, the real gross domestic product, the deflator for
the gross domestic product and the money market rate as a measure for the
monetary policy stance. Our dataset consists of time series for ten OECD
countries including Australia, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Japan,
the Netherlands, Spain, the UK and the USA spanning the period from the
first quarter of 1970 to the last quarter of 2005. This real house price dataset
was also employed in Tsatsaronis and Zhu (2004), OECD (2005), Ahearne et
al. (2005), Ceron and Suarez (2006), Ja¨ger and Voigtla¨nder (2006) and McK-
ieran and O’Reilly (2007), where we differ in methodology. First we use the
Hodrick-Prescott-filtered cyclical components of the time series and calculate
cross correlations between the cyclical components of house prices and the
cyclical components of prices, output and the interest rates for leads and lags
of these variables, a methodology also applied in Stock and Watson (1999).
After that we apply vectorautoregressions to the logarithmic levels of these
time series and cacullate the usual VAR statistics like impulse responses, fore-
cast error variance decompositions and Granger-causality tests. With the help
of the results we get from applying these methods we want to gain more and
robust insights about the empirical interplay between these variables and the
transmission of shocks to these variables.
Within this study the following results emerge. Cross correlations indicate a
strong link between the cyclical components of real house prices and output at
several leads and lags. We find out that a monetary policy shock lowers real
house prices in all ten OECD countries, where the interest rate shock explains
between 12 and 24 percent of the fluctuations in house prices. This finding
is in line with our intuition that increasing interest rates increase the cost of
financing real estate projects and thereby lower the demand for housing. We
do not find evidence that rising prices lead to rising house prices, because in-
flationary pressures increase the demand for real estate for the sake of hedging
inflation. A reason can be that inflation-indexed income from renting homes
is not reflected in the OECD house price index and that it only measures the
worth of the building. Our results give more support for the hypothesis that
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when the central bank raises interest rates to accomodate inflationary pres-
sures which is the cause of falling house prices. This hypothesis is empirically
supported by increasing interest rates and decreasing house prices after the
inflationary shock. Impulse responses indicate that house prices rise after an
output shock in nine of ten countries, which might be due to the fact that
rising house prices increase households’ net worth which gives them incentive
to increase their consumption expenditures (see Piazzesi et al. 2007). But
we also find evidence that real estate prices have a large impact on these key
macroeconomic variables. We find out that the house price shock is a germane
aggregate demand shock because it raises output and prices and leads to in-
creasing money market rates. The story behind this finding is that increasing
house prices lead to an increase in households’ net worth which leads to in-
creasing consumption expentitures and thereby stimulates aggregate demand.
This stimulus on aggregate demand leads to increasing output and inflation-
ary pressures on which the central bank reacts by tightening monetary policy
which leads to higher money market rates. We find out that 12 to 20 percent
of output fluctuations and around 10 to 20 percent of price fluctuations can be
traced back to the housing demand shock. Moreover, we find that these hous-
ing demand shocks are a key driver of money market rates. We conclude that
this channel is empirically relevant. However, we do not find evidence that a
higher value of housing as a collateral has any impact on interest rates. Our
results are in line with the results reported in Iacoviello (2000), who finds mon-
etary policy shocks lower house prices and that the timing in the response of
house prices matches that of output. Moreover, he finds that monetary shocks
are a key driving force of house price fluctuations. Goodhard and Hofmann
(2008) that there is a strong and multidirectional link between house prices,
monetary varaibles and the macroeconomy.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section two tackles the
transmission mechanisms, while section three presents the empirical model.
Section four contains the empirical results, while section five concludes.
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2 Transmission Channels
Within this section we want to derive theoretical transmission channels be-
tween these macroeconomic variables. We can use these intutions later on in
order to interpret the results of our econometric analysis.
From our economic intuition we can identify the following transmission chan-
nels from inflation, output and interest rates on real estate prices:
(i) When the monetary authority tightens monetary policy, this will trans-
late into an increase in the money market rate and thereby through
the mortgage market into higher costs of financing real estate projects.
Thus, the demand for real estate will decrease after a policy tightening
and thereby real estate prices.
(ii a) When a shock is increasing the price level unexpectedly, economic agents
try to protect their wealth by investing in real estate, because they believe
that real estate is a good hedge against inflation. Thus, this inflation
induced demand for real estate increases real estate prices.
(ii b) When inflation is rising, the monetary authority should respond by rais-
ing the Federal Funds Rate, which will lead to an increase in mortgage
market rates and thereby housing finance will be more expensive. This
will lower the demand for real estate and will lead to lower real estate
prices.
(iii) When a shock pushes output above its long term steady-state, firms’
demand for labor is increasing and thereby households decide to work
more. This increase in households’ labor income can either be consumed
or invested into real estate. Note that having a job increases the chances
to get a cheap loan for investing in homes. Thus, the demand for housing
is increasing when the economy is experiencing a boom phase, which will
translate into an increase in real estate prices. Moreover, firms need more
office space, which will also trigger into an increase in office real estate
prices.
But there are also feedbacks from the real estate sector onto the macroeconomy.
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We identified the following transmission channels:
(iv) When a shock leads to rising housing prices, there will be a rise in house-
holds’ net worth. This increase in wealth will lead to portfolio shifts
and to increases in households’ consumption expenditures (see Iacoviello
2004 and Piazzesi et al. 2007). This rise in the demand for consumption
goods will push the gross domestic product above its long term steady-
state level.
(v) When real estate prices are rising and thereby pushing consumption ex-
penditures and thusly aggregate demand they will lead to inflationary
pressures. Moreover, economic agents are trying to get higher rents,
which raises the costs of living which are reflected in the increase in the
price level.
(vi a) When real estate prices are rising and thereby households’ net worth,
the central bank committee might expect a future increase in aggregate
demand which increases inflation risks. Central bankers might respond
to increasing house prices by raising money market rates.
(vi b) When real estate prices are rising the value of collateral is increased and
thus banks have the possibility to give credit to households to whom they
did not before. Thus, a rise in real estate prices raises credit supply and
thusly leads to lower interest rates.
The following sections contain information about the used dataset, the empiri-
cal methodology and empirical results in order to get a robust inference about
which of these proposed channels is of empirical relevance and which one not.
3 Data and Methodology
The empirical analysis is based on the same dataset used in Ja¨ger and Voigtla¨n-
der (2006) consisting of the ten OECD countries Australia, Denmark, Finland,
France, Germany, Japan, the Netherlands, Spain, the UK and the USA which
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they directly got from the OECD2. The same house price dataset is also used in
Tsatsaronis and Zhu (2004), OECD (2005), Ahearne et al. (2006), Ceron and
Suarez (2006) and McQuinn and O’REally (2007), where we differ in method-
ology here. The time series range from the first quarter of 1970 to the last
quarter of 2005 making a total of 144 observations per time series. The time
series used for the analysis are the OECD real house price index, the deflator
for the gross domestic product as a measure of the aggregate price level, the
gross domestic product as a measure of output and a short term interest rate
as a measure of the monetary policy stance. In OECD (2005) one can find
a description of the real house price time series. The house price index of
Australia is an index of a weighted average of eight capital cities calculated by
the Australia Bureau of Statistics. For Denmark it is the index of one-family
houses sold which the OECD got from Statistics Denmark. Finland’s version
of the house price index consists of a basket of housing prices in metropolitan
areas calculated by the Bank of Finland. For Germany is an index consisting
of total resales which is originally supplied by th Bundesbank. In Japan it
is a nationwide urban land price index which is supplied by the Japan Real
Estate Insitute. The house price index for the Netherlands consists of exist-
ing dwellings calculated by the Nederlandsche Bank. The Spanish house price
index is supplied to the OECD by the Banco de Espana. In the UK it is a
mix-adjusted house price index supplied by ODPM, while for the USA is is
the nationwide single family house price index supplied by OFHEO. Moreover
one can read in OECD (2005) that they used data provided by the Bank for
International Settlements which are based on national sources for the countries
for the price indices in which the sample period was incomplete.
Because these house price data over this sample period are frequently used we
find it useful to elaborate on this darta, too. In contrast to the other cited
studies we differ a bit in methodology. The first part of our analysis is based on
the Hodrick-Prescott-filtered cyclical components of the time series. In order
to analyse how weak or strong they comove at business cycle frequencies we
calculate cross correlations for serveral leads and lags of the variables. This
2Many thanks to Manfred Ja¨ger and Michael Voigtla¨nder for supplying me their dataset
and Christophe Andre´ from OECD who supplied this dataset to them.
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methodology is inspired by the work of Stock and Watson (1999) where they
measure business fluctuations in U.S. time series. The second part of our anal-
ysis is based on the VAR-methodology which several of the here cited papers
also applied. The VAR approach, originally introduced by Sims (1980), is a
widely used approach for the empirical analysis of the monetary transmission
process3. Christiano et al. (1996a, 1996b) suggest the VAR approach to get
empirical robust results about the effects of monetary policy. In contrast to
traditional econometric approaches VAR models do not concentrate on system-
atic movements, but concentrate on the dynamic time series effects of shocks
to the economy. In contrast to the foregoing VAR papers on housing price
dynamics (Tsatsaronis and Zhu 2004, Ja¨ger and Voigtla¨nder 2006) we use a
simpler version of the VAR model here with just the price level, output, a
short term interest rate and the house price index as macroeconomic variables.
The reason is that we want to identify shocks that can be interpreted as an
aggregate supply shock (one that moves output and prices in opposite direc-
tions), an aggregate demand shock (one which moves output and prices in the
same direction), a monetary policy shock (one which increases the interest rate
and which leads to decreasing output and decreasing prices) and a house price
shock (about whose impact we want to learn more). In order to catch these
dynamic responses we employ the usual recursive identification scheme via the
Cholesky-decomposition of the variance-covariance matrix. The order of the
variables is as usual in the literature on monetary policy shocks with prices or-
dered first, then output and the monetary policy instrument ordered last (see
Favero 2001 for an overview over this methodology). This identification scheme
assumes a kind of monetary policy reaction function a la Taylor (1993) where
the policy maker reacts on all shocks immediatedly. Moreover, it implies that
output does not react in the current period to the interest rate shock, which is
justified by a lag in the monetary transmission process. Furthermore it implies
that prices do not react to the output shock as well as the monetary policy
shock in the current period. This restriction is justified by the assumption that
3See the contributions of Bagliano and Favero (1998), Bernanke and Blineder (1992),
Bernanke and Mihov (1997, 1998a, 1998b), Christiano et al. (1996, 1998), Blanchard
and Quah (1989), Gali (1992), Sims (1992), Strongin (1995), Uhlig (1997) and the text-
book treatments Amisano and Giannini (1997) and Favero (2001).
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prices are sticky in the short-run, so that monetary policy affects output before
it affects prices. Note that this view of the monetary transmission process is in
line with the inflation targeting model introduced by Svensson (1999a, 1999b).
Last but not least, we model house prices last because we assume that the
monetary policy maker might not react contemporaneously to developments
in the housing market, while the housing market reacts directly to all shocks.
Summing up, the VAR model assumes joint dynamics of the logarithms of the
price level pt, output yt, the short-term interest rate it and the house price
index ht. If we stack all four variables into the vector xt = [pt, yt, it, ht]
′ the
VAR model in reduced form of order k can be written as
xt = A1xt−1 + ...+ Akxt−k + ut, (1)
where ut is the VAR 4× 1 residual vector with mean zero and 4× 4 variance-
covariance matrix Ω, where the Aj are 4 × 4 coefficient matrices, which can
be estimated using the reduced form VAR. Because the VAR residuals are
contemporaneously correlated we cannot interpret them as primitive shocks
and cannot trace their isolated impact onto the variables of the VAR systems.
Because we need independent (or at least uncorrelated) shocks, which are
up to now unobservable to us, we have to ortogonalize them by identifying
restrictions. The VAR model in structural form (that means with identified
orthogonal shocks) looks as follows
xt = A1xt−1 + ...+ Akxt−k +Bεt, (2)
where the structural shocks summarized in the 4 × 1 vector εt have also zero
mean, however, they are contemporaneously uncorrelated and have unit vari-
ance by construction, thus, their variance covariance matrix is the identity
matrix. From equations (1) and (2) follows that the relationship between the
VAR residuals and the unobservable structural shocks is
ut = Bεt, (3)
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while the relationship between their variance-covariance matrices is
Ωt = E[utu
′
u] = E[Bεtε
′
tB
′] = BB′. (4)
This relationship places 10 restrictions on the matrix B, thus we need addi-
tional 6 restrictions in order to calculate all elements in B and thus identify
the structural shocks. Often one uses the Cholesky-decomposition in order to
identify the shocks. The Cholesky-identification scheme is a lower triangular
matrix B 
upt
uyt
uit
uht
 =

b11 0 0 0
b21 b22 0 0
b31 b32 b33 0
b41 b42 b43 b44


εpt
εyt
εit
εht
 . (5)
This identification scheme assumes that the price level reacts with a lag to
the output shock, the interest rate shock and the housing price shock. The
output reacts with a lag to the inflation shock, the interest rate shock and
the housing price shock. The central bank reacts only to the inflation shock
and the output shock and has its own shock which represents a deviation from
the monetary policy rule. House prices are assumed to react directly to all
shocks as already mentioned. Now that shocks are identifies we can start with
the empirical analysis. This is done first by caculating the impulse responses
αs(i, j) to an isolated one-time shock at time t to the system
αs(i, j) =
∂xi,t+s
∂εj,t
, for time s = 0, ..., (6)
which is nothing else than the expected future path of a variable xi,t after
the shock εj,t hit the VAR-system (see Favero 2001, pp. 174-175). The fore-
cast error variance decomposition can be calculated by first forecasting xt and
calculating the VAR-forecast errors as
xt+s − Etxt+s = C0εt + C1εt−1 + ...+ Csεt−s, (7)
where matrixces C can be calculated from the VAR-coefficient matrices and
the shock impact matrix B (see Favero 2001, pp. 174-175). The forecast error
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variance can now be calculated as
V ar(xt+s − Etxt+s) = C0C ′0 + C1C ′1 + ...+ CsC ′s, (8)
because the structural shocks have a variance-covariance matrix equal to the
identity matrix by construction. Note, that all shocks contribute to the forecast
error variance of each varaible. By deviding this system of equation through
the forecast error variance V ar(xt+s−Etxt+s), we get the percentage contribu-
tion of each shock to the forecast error variance of each variable. This statistic
measures the importance of one particular shock for the fluctuations of a vari-
able in the VAR system. Finally, one can test on Granger-causality (or more
precisely on Granger-non-causality, see Granger 1987). The Granger-causality
test the null hypothesis that the past of the variable xi,t has no impact on
the present or future of the variable xj,t in the VAR-system. This test can
be performed as zero coefficient restrictions on the pertinent elements (i, j)
of the coefficient matrices A1 to Ak. If we can reject the null hypothesis of
Granger-non-causality of one variable, this means that the past of this variable
determines the present of another varaible in the VAR-system.
4 Empirical Results
This section contains the empirical results. First of all we calculate cross
correlations between the Hodrick-Prescott-filtered cyclical components of the
time series for several leads and lags. After that we present the results of the
impulse response analysis, the forecast error variance decomposition and the
Granger-causality tests which we perform by applying a VAR-model to the
logarithmic levels of the data.
4.1 Volatilities and Cross Correlations
In this subsection we analyze statistical properties of the business cycle com-
ponents of the data series. We extract the cyclical components by applying the
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Hodrick-Prescott filter to the logarithms of the data series. The resulting cycli-
cal components are measured as the percentage deviation from the Hodrick-
Prescott-trend. Following the methodology apllied in Stock and Watson (1999)
we calculate volatilities, autocorrelations and cross correlations on these cycli-
cal components in order to get insights about the volatility, the persistence
and comovements between house prices and the other three macroeconomic
variables at business cycle frequencies.
Table 1 contains the standard deviations of the cyclical components of the
time series. From this table we can infer that the business cycle component of
real housing prices is more volatile than the cyclical components of inflation,
output and interes rates. The reason for the higher volatility might be the fact
that housing supply is inelastic at this frequencies, which has the effect that
changes in the demand for housing translate into volatility of housing prices.
Table 1: Volatilities
Volatilities
Inflation Output Interest Rate House Prices
Australia 0.017 0.013 0.019 0.042
Denmark 0.011 0.014 0.016 0.057
Finland 0.019 0.021 0.016 0.070
France 0.010 0.009 0.015 0.155
Germany 0.007 0.018 0.016 0.018
Japan 0.017 0.014 0.016 0.044
Netherlands 0.010 0.013 0.017 0.059
Spain 0.014 0.011 0.019 0.053
UK 0.023 0.015 0.018 0.069
USA 0.009 0.016 0.017 0.021
Volatilities are calculated as the standard deviations of the Hodrick-Prescott-filtered cycli-
cal components of the time series. The cyclical components are measured as percentage
deviations from the Hordrick-Prescott-trend. The dataset spans the period from 1970Q1 to
2005Q4.
Table 2 panel (a) shows autocorrelation coefficients of the cyclical component
of house prices for up to five lags. As one can see, all house price cycles display
similar degrees of persistence. Autocorrelation coefficients to lag one are in
a range between 0.884 (Australia) and 0.974 (France), while autocorrelations
to lag two range between 0.675 (Australia) and 0.894 (France). This finding
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indicates that house price cycles are quite persistent. We can compare these
autocorrelations with the autocorrelations of the cyclical component of the
price level which is given by panel (b) of table 2. What can be found here is
that the cyclical component of the price level is characterized by similar degrees
of persistence as house prices have. The autocorrelations of prices to their first
lag are in a range between 0.800 (Germany) and 0.902 (Japan), where auto-
correlations to their second lag are in a range between 0.633 (Netherlands)
and 0.811 (USA). If we compare these values to the autocorrelations of the
cyclical component of output (table 3 panel (3)), we see that they lie in a
range between 0.541 (Netherlands) and 0.905 (Finland) for the first lag, where
the autocorrelations to the second lag range between 0.387 (Netherlands) and
0.788 (Finland) indication that the house price cycle is more persistent com-
pared to the business cycle. Last, but not least, the persistence of the cyclical
component of interest rates lie in a range between 0.516 (Spain) and 0.878
(Denmark and Germany) for the first lag and between 0.013 (Spain) and 0.656
(Denmark and Germany). Thus, indicating that the cyclical movements of
house prices and the price level are more persistent compared to the cyclical
movements of output and interest rates. In order to get an inference about
how these cycles comove, we have to calculate cross correlations between them
for several leads and lags. Results from this excercise can be found in table 4.
Table 4 contains cross correlations of the Hodrick-Prescott-filtered time series
of house price with leads and lags of the business cycle components of output,
inflation and interest rates. Panel (a) of this table contains the cross correla-
tions of real house prices and output. In nine of ten countries we find a strong
contemporaneous correlation between house prices and output ranging from
0.317 (Germany) to 0.797 (Finland). The only exception is France with just
a correlation of 0.060. Moreover we find strong correlations of house prices
with past output even for France. With respect to the one quarter lagged
output these correlations range from 0.090 (France) to 0.777 (Finland), while
the correlations between house prices and the two quarter lagged output range
from 0.038 (Germany) to 0.719 (Finland). The strong correlations between
the cyclical components of house prices and output inidcate that the housing
market is strongly moving with the business cycle. Or more precisely, that
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Table 2: Autocorrelations
(a) Autocorrelation of House Prices
Lag 1 2 3 4 5
Australia 0.884 0.675 0.410 0.143 -0.087
Denmark 0.899 0.763 0.555 0.383 0.239
Finland 0.952 0.843 0.688 0.506 0.316
France 0.974 0.894 0.841 0.788 0.736
Germany 0.925 0.802 0.660 0.513 0.372
Japan 0.942 0.825 0.670 0.479 0.283
Netherlands 0.945 0.850 0.716 0.548 0.380
Spain 0.915 0.744 0.542 0.346 0.176
UK 0.941 0.813 0.631 0.421 0.211
USA 0.912 0.796 0.655 0.472 0.304
(b) Autocorrelations of the Price Level
Lag 1 2 3 4 5
Australia 0.872 0.731 0.596 0.448 0.251
Denmark 0.864 0.711 0.558 0.388 0.209
Finland 0.867 0.701 0.505 0.309 0.104
France 0.901 0.753 0.594 0.437 0.277
Germany 0.800 0.657 0.505 0.373 0.226
Japan 0.902 0.726 0.493 0.239 0.008
Netherlands 0.818 0.633 0.523 0.415 0.264
Spain 0.875 0.723 0.571 0.431 0.285
UK 0.896 0.748 0.572 0.352 0.135
USA 0.933 0.811 0.661 0.483 0.276
Autocorrelations are calculated on the Hodrick-Prescott-filtered cyclical components of the
time series. The cyclical components are measured as percentage deviations from the
Hordrick-Prescott-trend. The Dataset spans the period from 1970Q1 to 2005Q4.
output is a key driver of the housing cycle at business cycle frequencies. Cor-
relations of house prices with future output display also high values indicating
that past house prices have a significant impact on the business cycle. These
correlations range from 0.040 (France) to 0.679 (Denmark). Thus, there is
evidence that the housing market and aggregate output influence each other
during the business cycle, where causality might run in both directions. The
high correlations between past output and housing prices can be explained as
follows. If output is above its long-term average more workers are employed
and thus household income is increases. People want to invest these additional
funds, where they prefer investing in real estate because housing has also the
character of shelter. Because having a job increases the chances to get a cheap
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Table 3: Autocorrelations
(a) Autocorrelation of Output
Lag 1 2 3 4 5
Australia 0.714 0.481 0.329 0.072 -0.044
Denmark 0.805 0.644 0.393 0.145 -0.048
Finland 0.905 0.788 0.644 0.480 0.321
France 0.853 0.668 0.456 0.245 0.093
Germany 0.619 0.403 0.266 0.170 0.059
Japan 0.805 0.627 0.457 0.213 0.009
Netherlands 0.541 0.387 0.251 0.127 0.113
Spain 0.825 0.719 0.551 0.360 0.254
UK 0.806 0.647 0.503 0.310 0.165
USA 0.870 0.697 0.489 0.288 0.086
(b) Autocorrelations of Interest Rates
Lag 1 2 3 4 5
Australia 0.736 0.470 0.282 0.092 -0.196
Denmark 0.878 0.665 0.434 0.231 0.035
Finland 0.717 0.462 0.286 0.157 -0.010
France 0.813 0.531 0.260 0.036 -0.131
Germany 0.878 0.665 0.434 0.231 0.035
Japan 0.835 0.624 0.395 0.141 -0.113
Netherlands 0.744 0.435 0.247 0.051 -0.154
Spain 0.516 0.013 0.038 -0.012 -0.280
UK 0.801 0.569 0.327 0.144 -0.040
USA 0.784 0.525 0.397 0.280 0.138
Autocorrelations are calculated on the Hodrick-Prescott-filtered cyclical components of the
time series. The cyclical components are measured as percentage deviations from the
Hordrick-Prescott-trend. The Dataset spans the period from 1970Q1 to 2005Q4.
loan in the mortgage market agents want to invest in real estate when employ-
ment is high. The strong correlation between house prices and future output
can be explained as follows. If house prices rise above their long-term average
households wealth increases. This increase in wealth leads to higher consump-
tion which translates into higher output. Empirical evidence for these wealth
effects on consumption can be found in ...
Panel (b) of table 4 contains cross correlations of house prices with leads and
lags of the business cycle components of inflation. For the contemporaneous
correlations we find that they are strong if they are negative ranging from -
0.224 (Japan) to -0.706 (USA), while they are small if they are positive ranging
from 0.011 (France) to 0.288 (Finland). If we consider only correlations to past
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inflation we find strong and negative correlations for most of the countries con-
sidered. If we consider correlations with the 1 quarter lagged inflation rate we
find negative correlations ranging from -0.024 (France) to 0.744 (USA), where
if we consider correlations to the two quarter lagged inflation rate we will find
negative correlations ranging from -0.061 (France) to 0.809 (USA). Finland and
Spain are the exceptions having positve correlations ranging from 0.156 and
0.021 (France) to 0.246 and 0.220 (Spain). What is the explanation of the neg-
ative relationship between house prices and past inflation? Consider inflation is
above its long-term average (e. g. the inflation target of the central bank). The
central bank will react by pushing interest rates, which will increase the costs
of financing homes. Therefore, housing demand declines which will lead to the
decline in housing prices. If we compare the correlations of house prices with
future inflation we find a positve correlation to the one quarter ahead inflation
rate for six countries ranging from 0.014 (Japan) to 0.400 (Finland), while we
find negative correlations for four countries ranging from -0.292 (Netherlands)
to -0.551 (Denmark). Again correlations seem to be higher in magnitude if
they are negative indicating that the negative relationship might be stronger
than the positve. A positve realtionship between house prices and future in-
flation can be explained as follows. Assume that house prices are above their
long-term average. This increase in wealth increase households’ demand for
consumption goods and thereby aggregate demand. The increase in aggregate
demand pushes the inflation rate above its long-term average. But what ex-
plains the negative correlation between house prices and future inflation which
seems to be stronger than the positive one? Suppose house prices rise above
their long-term average which pushes aggregate demand. Homeowners may
want higher rents for supplying housing which increases to cost of living and
thereby inflation.
Panel (c) of table 5 contains cross correlation between house prices and leads
and lags of money market rates. If we compare the contemporaneous cor-
relations we find positive correlations for eight countries ranging from 0.072
(France) to 0.551 (UK), while we find negative correlations for Denmark (-
0.407) and the Netherlands (-0.140). If we compare the positive correlations
to past interest rates we find correlations ranging from 0.017 (Finland) to 0.443
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(Germany) for the one period lagged interest rate, while we find positive cor-
relations ranging from 0.015 (France) to 0.415 (Germany). The negative cor-
relations of Danish house prices to lagged interest rates are -0.383 and -0.336,
while the are -0.233 and -0.307 for the Netherlands. The negative relation-
ship between past interest rates and housing demand is straightforward. If
interest rates rise above their long-term average housing finance will become
more costly. In response to increasing interes rates housing demand will de-
cline which will lead to decreasing house prices. We also expects this link to
be strong, as mirrored by the strong negative correlations of Denmark and
the Netherlands. But these positive correlations are still puzzling. We find
strong positve cross correlations between house prices and future interest rates
ranging from 0.094 (France) to 0.671 (UK) in eight countries. Why are in-
terest rates increasing in response to higher house prices? If the increase in
house prices triggers aggregate demand central bankers will expects higher fu-
ture output and higher future inflation (see panels (a) and (b)) and react by
tightening monetary policy which will lead to increasing interest rates. The
only exceptions are Denmark and the Netherlands which have also negative
correlations between house prices and future inflation.
4.2 Impulse Responses
A more detailed picture about the interaction of the four time series can be
given by calculating impulse respones. Thus, we can trace out the dynamic
impact of a well defined shock onto the time series behavior of the four vari-
ables.
4.2.1 Impulse Responses to an Inflationary Shock
In eight of ten countries the inflationary shock pulls output below its long-
term average (see table 5, panel (b)). Because in all countries it pushes prices
and output on impact opposite directions, this shock can be interpreted as
an aggregate supply shock. Denmark and Spain are the only counries where
output rise to positive levels in the subsequent quarters. Aggregate supply
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Table 4: Cross-Correlations
(a) Cross Correlation with House Prices
Output(-2) Output(-1) Output Output(+1) Output(+2)
Australia 0.381 0.473 0.485 0.433 0.340
Denmark 0.447 0.545 0.633 0.679 0.675
Finland 0.719 0.777 0.797 0.772 0.703
France 0.112 0.090 0.060 0.040 0.031
Germany 0.038 0.035 0.317 0.223 0.156
Japan 0.674 0.660 0.605 0.478 0.306
Netherlands 0.187 0.266 0.329 0.329 0.349
Spain 0.510 0.528 0.512 0.483 0.388
UK 0.660 0.657 0.616 0.498 0.343
USA 0.648 0.671 0.660 0.627 0.532
(b) Cross Correlation with House Prices
Inflation(-2) Inflation(-1) Inflation Inflation(+1) Inflation(+2)
Australia -0.045 -0.001 0.054 0.119 0.171
Denmark -0.271 -0.383 -0.477 -0.551 -0.598
Finland 0.021 0.156 0.288 0.400 0.488
France -0.061 -0.024 0.011 0.042 0.067
Germany -0.180 -0.070 0.047 0.181 0.259
Japan -0.603 -0.435 -0.224 0.014 0.245
Netherlands -0.107 -0.200 -0.263 -0.292 -0.305
Spain 0.220 0.246 0.237 0.218 0.198
UK -0.506 -0.482 -0.429 -0.327 -0.193
USA -0.809 -0.774 -0.706 -0.568 -0.402
(c) Cross Correlation with House Prices
Interest(-2) Interest(-1) Interest Interest(+1) Interest(+2)
Australia -0.093 0.143 0.379 0.555 0.612
Denmark -0.336 -0.383 -0.407 -0.294 -0.128
Finland -0.122 0.017 0.172 0.339 0.476
France 0.015 0.047 0.072 0.094 0.110
Germany 0.415 0.443 0.461 0.477 0.479
Japan 0.063 0.238 0.419 0.598 0.694
Netherlands -0.307 -0.233 -0.140 -0.062 0.036
Spain 0.203 0.254 0.278 0.276 0.217
UK 0.184 0.374 0.551 0.671 0.728
USA -0.060 -0.063 0.234 0.408 0.504
Cross correlations are calculated on the Hodrick-Prescott-filtered cyclical components of
the time series. The cyclical components are measured as percentage deviations from the
Hordrick-Prescott-trend. The Dataset spans the period from 1970Q1 to 2005Q4.
shocks confront central bankers with a trade-off between stabilizing inflation
(tightening monetary policy) and stabilizing output (cutting interest rates).
This trade-off can be seen in panel (c). In six countries interest rates rise in
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response to the aggregate supply shocks indicating that the central bank will
fight inflation, while interest rates drop in four countries indicating that the
central bank tries to stimulate output. One interesting result emerges. In
countries, where the aggregate supply shock drops the output below its long-
term level house prices decrease below their long-term level, while in the two
countries where the inflationary shock leads to increasing output, house prices
increase. This result is in favor of the strong link between output movements
and house price movements which we already saw in table 2. As already said,
output declines on impact ranging from -0.01 (Denmark) to -0.60 (Germany).
After one year the output gap ranges from -0.02 (France) to -0.52 (Japan),
while it is 0.12 in Denmark and 0.09 in Spain. This pattern is persistent
for the next years as can be infered from the impluse responses up to four
years after the shock hit the economy. In response to the aggregate supply
shock house prices behave differently on impact. In six countries house prices
decline on impact, while they rise in four countries. But note that the positive
impulse responses are only small in magnitude. In the subsequent quarters
we can inspect a tendency for house prices to decline. In five countries the
inflationary shock is destabilizing because of its persistent nature which leads
to a gradual decline in house prices. In three countries the response is hump-
shaped having its through after four quarters in Germany, eight quarters in
Japan and twelve quarters in the UK.
4.2.2 Impulse Responses to an Output Shock
The output shock increase the price level in all ten countries (see table 6
panel (b)). Because it moves prices and output into the same direction, it
can be interpreted as an aggregate demand shock. In light of the aggegate
demand shock the central banker does not have to face a trade-off, because
monetary policy can smooth both, output and inflation. Thus, in response to
the aggregate demand shock the central bank has to tighten monetary policy.
As can be seen from panel (c) this reaction can only be found in six out of
ten countries, where money market rates increase. Exceptions are Australia,
Denmark, Spain and the UK. As can be seen from panel (a) house prices rise
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Table 5: Impulse Responses to an Inflationary Shock
Quarters (a) House Prices
after Shock 0 4 8 12 16
Australia -0.02 0.22 -0.10 -0.38 -0.54
Denmark 0.04 0.48 0.46 0.42 0.39
Finland 0.09 -0.20 -0.63 -0.99 -1.22
France 0.01 0.07 -0.22 -0.55 -0.81
Germany -0.13 -0.23 -0.20 -0.14 -0.07
Japan -0.36 -1.80 -2.13 -1.82 -1.41
Netherlands 0.01 -0.01 -0.17 -0.37 -0.56
Spain -0.23 0.68 0.89 0.75 0.53
UK -0.41 -1.04 -1.33 -1.38 -1.30
USA -0.35 -0.87 -1.11 -1.28 -1.37
Quarters (b) Gross Domestic Product
after Shock 0 4 8 12 16
Australia -0.26 -0.07 -0.14 -0.18 -0.18
Denmark -0.01 0.12 0.14 0.14 0.15
Finland -0.14 -0.19 -0.33 -0.42 -0.46
France -0.01 -0.02 -0.13 -0.19 -0.21
Germany -0.60 -0.50 -0.42 -0.33 -0.25
Japan -0.12 -0.52 -0.46 -0.15 -0.27
Netherlands -0.26 -0.14 -0.15 -0.17 -0.19
Spain -0.05 0.09 0.11 0.09 0.06
UK -0.21 -0.31 -0.35 -0.33 -0.29
USA -0.10 -0.21 -0.30 -0.28 -0.19
Quarters (c) Money Market Rates
after Shock 0 4 8 12 16
Australia 0.18 0.36 0.28 0.20 0.16
Denmark 0.06 -0.10 -0.06 -0.05 -0.05
Finland 0.25 0.41 0.33 0.27 0.20
France 0.18 0.38 0.27 0.19 0.14
Germany -0.03 -0.00 -0.02 -0.01 0.01
Japan 0.16 0.15 -0.11 -0.10 -0.01
Netherlands -0.16 -0.02 0.03 0.04 0.05
Spain 0.17 0.09 0.05 0.04 0.02
UK 0.22 0.22 0.13 0.09 0.07
USA 0.18 0.28 0.16 0.03 -0.06
Estimated impulse responses to an inflationary shock based on the Cholesky identification
scheme. Entries from panels (a) and (b) are measured as percentage deviations from steady-
state, while the entries from panel (c) are measured as percentage point deviations from the
steady-state level. All impulse responses were multiplied by 100 percent.
in all countries but France in response to the aggregate demand shock. This
increase ranges from 0.08 (Spain) to 1.57 (Finland) one year after the shock
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hit the economy, while it ranges from 0.01 (USA) to 2.00 (Finland) two years
after the shock hit the economy. In seven countries we can find a hump-shaped
response which has its maximum after four quarters in Denmark, Germany and
Japan, while it has its maximum after eight quarters in Australia and Finland.
In the Netherlands and in the UK the house price hike reaches its maximum
three years after the shock hit the economy. The economics behind these
responses are the following. The demand shock increases output and inflation.
The output stimulus leads to an increasing demand for real estate because more
people are at work and thus it is easier for them to get a mortgage loan when
being employed. This response is in line with the strong cross correlations
between house prices and current and past output which we already saw in
table 4.
4.2.3 Impulse Responses to a Monetary Policy Shock
Table 7 contains estimated impulse responses to a shock to the money market
rate. We interpret this shock as a monetary policy shock. As a monetary policy
shock usually does, this shock leads to a drop in output in all ten OECD cour-
tries. This drop in output reaches from -0.01 (Germany) to -0.79 (UK) eight
quarters after the realization of the shock. The price level rises in response
to the monetary policy shock in most of the countries. This counterintuitive
finding is called ”price puzzle” and results from ommiting oil prices in the VAR
system (see Favero 2001). As expected the monetary policy shock leads to
declining house prices in the long run. Twelve quarters after the shock hit
the economy this drop in house prices ranges from -0.04 (Germany) to -2.91
(Netherlands). The deline in house prices is larger compared to the decline
in output in all countries. This corresponds to the finding that the volatility
of house prices is larger compared to the volatility of output, inflation and
interest rates. The decline in real house prices after a monetary tightening
has the following implications. When monetary policy tightens, interest rates
in the mortgage market will also tighten leading to higher costs of financing
houses. Higher costs of financing means that the demand for housing will
decline leading to a drop in house prices. Because the drop in house prices
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Table 6: Impulse Responses to an Output Shock
Quarters (a) House Prices
after Shock 0 4 8 12 16
Australia 0.19 0.98 1.00 0.94 0.91
Denmark 0.54 1.50 1.47 1.41 1.35
Finland 0.39 1.57 2.00 1.88 1.50
France -0.05 -0.07 -0.19 -0.18 -0.10
Germany 0.14 0.28 0.23 0.10 -0.01
Japan 0.31 0.36 0.11 -0.11 -0.25
Netherlands 0.42 0.55 0.70 0.92 1.15
Spain -0.21 0.08 0.40 0.67 0.86
UK 0.47 1.10 1.34 1.41 1.37
USA -0.01 0.07 0.01 -0.02 -0.04
Quarters (b) Price Level
after Shock 0 4 8 12 16
Australia 0.00 0.22 0.29 0.32 0.32
Denmark 0.00 -0.07 0.01 0.08 0.14
Finland 0.00 0.24 0.31 0.34 0.34
France 0.00 0.10 0.17 0.16 0.11
Germany 0.00 0.13 0.19 0.20 0.18
Japan 0.00 0.10 0.10 0.03 -0.06
Netherlands 0.00 0.16 0.21 0.24 0.28
Spain 0.00 0.02 0.07 0.11 0.16
UK 0.00 0.06 0.11 0.16 0.19
USA 0.00 0.06 0.13 0.16 0.16
Quarters (c) Money Market Rates
after Shock 0 4 8 12 16
Australia -0.24 0.02 -0.03 -0.08 -0.11
Denmark -0.12 -0.19 -0.10 -0.10 -0.09
Finland 0.18 0.00 0.02 0.05 0.07
France 0.47 0.40 0.32 0.30 0.31
Germany 1.45 1.23 1.07 0.93 0.83
Japan -0.16 0.09 0.00 -0.08 -0.12
Netherlands 0.32 0.04 -0.05 0.07 -0.08
Spain -0.25 -0.20 -0.17 -0.16 -0.15
UK -0.09 -0.09 -0.08 -0.07 -0.07
USA 0.30 0.31 0.12 0.05 0.01
Estimated impulse responses to an output shock based on the Choleski identification scheme.
Entries from panels (a) and (b) are measured as percentage deviations from steady-state,
while the entries from panel (c) are measured as percentage point deviations from the steady-
state level. Note that all impulse responses are multiplied by 100 percent.
leads to a lower wealth of households it will have direct effects on households
consumption expenditures and thereby on the business cycle. Moreover, if
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house prices drop the value of collateral in the housing market declines which
shortens households’ credit constraints. Banks will only supply loans to house-
holds in exchange of higher risk premiums on the mortgage rate. Thus, tighter
monetary policy may lead to an large increase in mortage rates.
4.2.4 Impulse Responses to a House Price Shock
Table 8 contains impulse responses of the price level, of gross domestic product
and money market rates to an unexpected increase in housing prices. We find
out that a shock to house prices leads to an increasing price level, in all of
the countries, an increasing gross domestic product in seven of ten countries
and to increasing money market rates in nine of ten countries. Eight quarters
after the house price shock the price level rises in a range of 0.01 (Denmark) to
0.81 (Australia), while it rises to 0.07 (Spain) to 0.99 (Australia) 16 Quarters
after the shock. Thus, the housing price shock has a persistent effect on goods
prices. The rise in output ranges from 0.10 (Japan) to 0.30 (Finland) in the
countries where it rises eight quarters after the shock hit the economy. The
money market rates rise in a range of 0.28 (Spain) to 0.52 (Finland) after the
increase in house prices. The economics behind these impulse responses might
be the following. Because the house price shock increases prices and output it
can be interpreted as a germane aggregate demand shock. Thus, the increase
in house prices leads to a higher wealth of households which translates into
a higher demand for goods and services. This increase in aggregate demand
leads to inflationary pressures on which the central bank reacts by tightening
monetary policy.
4.3 Forecast Error Variance Decompositions
Table 9 contains the forecast error variance decompositions of house prices
(panel (a)) and output (panel (b)) with respect to the four shocks. These
forecast error variance decompositions are measured in percentage fraction of
the total variance of house prices and output, respectively, and indicate the
contribution of the pertinent shocks to the variation in output and house prices.
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Table 7: Impulse Responses to a Monetary Policy
Quarters (a) House Prices
after Shock 0 4 8 12 16
Australia -0.05 -0.70 -1.19 -1.36 -1.36
Denmark -0.66 -0.49 -0.39 -0.40 -0.41
Finland -0.29 -0.67 -0.53 -0.58 -0.83
France -0.01 -0.72 -1.61 -2.11 -2.42
Germany -0.05 0.07 0.03 -0.04 -0.06
Japan -0.32 -1.51 -2.02 -1.95 -1.71
Netherlands 0.02 -1.52 -2.51 -2.91 -3.01
Spain -0.15 -0.59 -0.71 -0.64 -0.53
UK 0.21 -1.32 -2.32 -2.63 -2.58
USA -0.09 -0.72 -1.06 -1.32 -1.52
Quarters (b) Gross Domestic Product
after Shock 0 4 8 12 16
Australia 0.00 -0.28 -0.51 -0.59 -0.59
Denmark 0.00 -0.27 -0.25 -0.23 -0.21
Finland 0.00 -0.37 -0.56 -0.66 -0.78
France 0.00 -0.30 -0.53 -0.58 -0.56
Germany 0.00 0.10 -0.01 -0.04 -0.01
Japan 0.00 -0.31 -0.26 -0.17 -0.11
Netherlands 0.00 -0.45 -0.65 -0.70 -0.68
Spain 0.00 -0.22 -0.21 -0.19 -0.17
UK 0.00 -0.50 -0.79 -0.84 -0.80
USA 0.00 -0.50 -0.76 -0.80 -0.74
Quarters (c) Price Level
after Shock 0 4 8 12 16
Australia 0.00 0.51 0.67 0.69 0.66
Denmark 0.00 -0.02 -0.04 -0.06 -0.07
Finland 0.00 0.28 0.36 0.41 0.42
France 0.00 0.36 0.67 0.72 0.65
Germany 0.00 0.26 0.38 0.38 0.35
Japan 0.00 0.38 0.10 -0.14 -0.27
Netherlands 0.00 0.29 0.28 0.17 0.02
Spain 0.00 0.09 0.06 0.03 0.01
UK 0.00 0.67 1.20 1.28 1.21
USA 0.00 0.24 0.32 0.28 0.15
Estimated impulse responses to a shock to the money market rate based on the Cholesky
identification scheme. Entries from panels (a), (b) and (c) are measured as percentage devi-
ations from steady-state. Note, that all impulse responses are multiplied by 100 percent.
The reported numbers indicate the contribution of the shocks eight quarters
after they hit the economy. As one can see, most of the variation in house
prices is due to the house price shock. This contribution ranges from 42.75
Demary (2009): Housing Price Dynamics 26
Table 8: Impulse Responses to a House Price Shock
Quarters (a) Price Level
after Shock 0 4 8 12 16
Australia 0.00 0.46 0.81 0.95 0.99
Denmark 0.00 -0.04 0.01 0.08 0.12
Finland 0.00 0.29 0.43 0.42 0.35
France 0.00 0.21 0.38 0.56 0.75
Germany 0.00 0.12 0.25 0.35 0.40
Japan 0.00 0.37 0.76 0.89 0.92
Netherlands 0.00 0.04 0.12 0.23 0.32
Spain 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.07 0.07
UK 0.00 -0.05 0.29 0.59 0.72
USA 0.00 0.17 0.40 0.60 0.76
Quarters (b) Gross Domestic Product
after Shock 0 4 8 12 16
Australia 0.00 -0.01 -0.26 -0.40 -0.45
Denmark 0.00 0.34 0.28 0.18 0.10
Finland 0.00 0.57 0.30 -0.22 -0.67
France 0.00 0.01 -0.01 -0.08 -0.17
Germany 0.00 0.25 0.19 0.02 -0.15
Japan 0.00 0.18 0.10 0.05 0.03
Netherlands 0.00 -0.01 -0.03 -0.13 -0.25
Spain 0.00 0.35 0.29 0.06 -0.11
UK 0.00 0.12 -0.15 -0.40 -0.53
USA 0.00 0.12 -0.11 -0.26 -0.36
Quarters (c) Interest Rates
after Shock 0 4 8 12 16
Australia 0.00 0.60 0.41 0.26 0.19
Denmark 0.00 -0.29 -0.04 -0.02 -0.02
Finland 0.00 0.36 0.52 0.54 0.48
France 0.00 0.16 0.32 0.38 0.42
Germany 0.00 0.34 0.44 0.37 0.27
Japan 0.00 0.50 0.49 0.28 0.13
Netherlands 0.00 -0.28 -0.07 0.05 0.10
Spain 0.00 0.40 0.28 0.21 0.16
UK 0.00 0.54 0.50 0.34 0.21
USA 0.00 0.36 0.29 0.27 0.27
Estimated impulse responses to a house price shock based on the Cholesky identification
scheme. Entries from panels (a) and (b) are measured as percentage deviations from steady-
state, while the entries from panel (c) are measured as percentage point deviations from the
steady-state level. Note, that all impulse responses are multiplied by 100 percent.
(USA) percent to 95.75 (Spain) percent. In five countries the money market
shock has explanatory power for the variation in house prices. In the USA
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it explains 24.18 percent of the variation, while it explains 21.65 percent in
Japan. In Spain only 1.66 percent of the variation in house prices can be
explained by the money market shock. In Australia, Denmark and Finland
around 13 percent of the house price variation can be explained by the output
shock. Different are Japan and the USA. Here 27.89 percent (Japan) and 32.84
percent (USA) of the total variation in house prices can be explained by the
inflation shock. Summing up, one can conclude that it is house price shocks
and to some degree interest rate shocks that drive housing price dynamics.
Shocks to the price level and shocks to output play only a minor role. Note,
that these findings stand in contrast to Tsatsaronis and Zhu (2004), who find
that inflation has a large effect on house prices.
Panel (b) of table 9 contains the decomposition of the variation in output.
Here, a large degree of output fluctuations are due to aggregate demand shocks.
The contribution of these shocks range from 56.99 (UK) to 85.89 (Australia).
Exception is the USA, where only 1.63 percent of the variation of output is due
to aggregate demand shocks. Here a lot of variation in output is contributed to
aggregate supply shocks (71,06 percent), money market shocks (14.09 percent)
and housing market shocks (13.22 percent). As expected the monetary policy
shock has strong explanatory power for the output variation in most of the
countries. The contribution of housing demand shocks are either low like in
Australia (1.66 percent), Germany (2.36 percent) or Japan (2.37 percent) or it
is high like in Denmark (12.79 percent), Finland (14.98), Spain (19.87 percent)
and the USA (13.22 percent). This high contribution in the USA and Spain
leads to the conclusion that there is a strong influence of the housing market
to output fluctuations.
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Table 9: Forecast Error Variance Decomposition
(a) House Prices
Price Level Output Interest Rate House Prices
Australia 0.39 12.24 9.43 77.94
Denmark 1.20 12.94 2.12 83.74
Finland 0.67 13.88 2.05 83.40
France 0.25 0.25 18.74 80.76
Germany 2.32 3.15 0.15 94.38
Japan 27.89 0.99 21.65 49.48
Netherlands 0.04 2.08 17.21 80.67
Spain 2.34 0.25 1.66 95.75
UK 6.08 6.72 12.76 74.43
USA 32.84 0.22 24.18 42.75
(b) Gross Domestic Product
Price Level Output Interest Rate House Prices
Australia 1.67 85.89 10.78 1.66
Denmark 1.90 77.40 7.90 12.79
Finland 3.87 69.96 11.18 14.98
France 1.58 59.06 39.33 0.02
Germany 13.87 83.33 0.44 2.36
Japan 22.46 67.20 7.97 2.37
Netherlands 2.01 73.85 23.20 0.04
Spain 1.68 70.25 8.20 19.87
UK 10.36 56.99 31.43 1.22
USA 71.06 1.63 14.09 13.22
Forecast error variance decompositions based on the Choleski identification scheme. Entries
from panels (a) and (b) are measured as the percentage contribution which each of the four
shocks (inflation shock, output shock, money market shock, house price shock) has to the
forecast error variance of the pertinent variable indicated in panel (a) and (b) eight quarters
after the shock has hit the economy. Note that the contribution of the four shocks sum to
100 percent.
Table 10 contains the forecast error variance decomposition of the money mar-
ket rate (panel (c)) and the price level variation (panel (d)). Surprisingly, the
housing demand shock has a strong impact on the fluctuations in the money
market rate indicating a strong link between the mortgage market and the
money market. The contribution of the housing market shock to the varia-
tion in interest rate ranges from 5.65 (France) to 40.24 (Japan). Compared
to these numbers the contribution of inflation shocks in Japan are only 8.05
percent, while the contribution of the output shock is only 1.44 percent. As
another example the contribution of housing price shocks is 18.04 percent in
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Germany, while the contribution of perice level shocks is just 0.07 percent and
6.79 percent here.
Table 10 panel (d) contains the contribution of these shocks to the price level
variation. In four countries the housing demand shock has a strong impact
on the price level like in Australia (14.25 percent), Germany (10.48 percent),
Japan (19.38 percent) and the USA (13.22 percent), while it plays only a minor
role in the remaining six countries. This strong contribution of housing price
fluctuations to price level fluctuations can be due to the fact that housing plays
a signnificant role in the goods basket on which the price index is constructed
in these countries and therefore plays a major role in the determination of the
costs of living.
4.4 Granger-Causality Tests
Granger-causality is given if the inclusion of a variable included in the vec-
torautoregressive model significanty increases the forecasting performance of
one variable of the model. Thus, Granger-causality is given if the past of one
variable has a significant impact on the future of another variable. Table 11
contains the tests on Granger-causality for house prices (panel (a)) and the
price level (panel (b)). In panel (a) we test the null hypothesis that either the
price level, output or money market rates have no forecasting power for house
prices. For only two out of ten countries (Japan and Spain) we can reject that
inflation has no forecasting power for house prices, while we can reject that
output has no forecasting power just for the USA and Japan. But we can
reject that the money market rate has no forecasting power for house prices
for France, the Netherlands, the UK and the USA.
In panel (b) of table 11 we test the null hypothesis that house prices, output
and the money market rate have no forecasting power for the price level. In
only two cases (Netherlands and USA) we find that the inclusion of house
prices enhances the forecasting performance of prices. The link between past
interest rates and prices seems to be stronger here (seven rejections).
Table 12 contains results of the tests of Granger causality for output (panel
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Table 10: Forecast Error Variance Decomposition
(c) Interest Rate
Price Level Output Interest Rate House Prices
Australia 7.77 0.62 71.67 19.94
Denmark 1.20 5.53 68.56 24.71
Finland 14.69 0.37 71.31 13.62
France 16.00 1.78 76.57 5.65
Germany 0.07 6.79 75.10 18.04
Japan 8.05 1.44 50.27 40.24
Netherlands 0.84 3.65 88.86 6.66
Spain 2.16 7.34 75.88 14.61
UK 5.96 1.02 67.36 25.66
USA 9.18 12.47 66.61 11.74
(d) Price Level
Price Level Output Interest Rate House Prices
Australia 69.97 2.65 13.12 14.25
Denmark 97.18 1.84 0.61 0.37
Finland 88.72 2.86 3.81 4.61
France 80.54 1.00 14.06 4.41
Germany 47.98 8.49 33.05 10.48
Japan 72.55 0.74 7.32 19.38
Netherlands 2.91 73.85 23.20 0.04
Spain 97.48 0.47 1.82 0.23
UK 78.83 0.16 20.44 0.57
USA 71.06 1.63 14.09 13.22
Forecast error variance decompositions based on the Choleski identification scheme. Entries
from panels (c), and (d) are measured as the percentage contribution which each of the four
shocks (inflation shock, output shock, money market shock, house price shock) has to the
forecast error variance of the pertinent variable indicated in panel (c) and (d) eight quarters
after the shock has hit the economy. Note that the contribution of the four shocks sum to
100 percent.
(c)) and the money market rate (panel (d)). We find out that the inclusion
of house prices into the VAR system improves the forecasting performance of
output in six of ten countries (Denmark, Finland, Japan, Spain and the USA).
But we also found out that inflation and the money market rate have signifi-
cant forecasting power for output in most of the countries. This link between
the housing market and output was already found in cross correlations and
impulse responses. In panel (d) we find that the inclusion of inflation does
only Granger-cause the money market rate in two countries (Japan and the
USA), while the inclusion of output has only significant forecasting power in
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Table 11: Granger-Causality Tests
(a) ... does not Granger-Cause House Prices
Inflation Output Interest Rate
Australia 3.18 (0.20) 4.92 (0.08) 3.79 (0.15)
Denmark 0.62 (0.73) 2.15 (0.34) 1.70 (0.42)
Finland 3.87 (0.14) 4.69 (0.10) 0.52 (0.77)
France 0.91 (0.64) 1.94 (0.38) 8.19 (0.02)
Germany 0.69 (0.71) 3.39 (0.18) 3.24 (0.20)
Japan 8.12 (0.02) 8.07 (0.02) 1.04 (0.59)
Netherlands 3.16 (0.21) 3.99 (0.14) 9.23 (0.01)
Spain 6.27 (0.04) 3.41 (0.18) 0.27 (0.87)
UK 1.15 (0.56) 2.03 (0.36) 12.41 (0.00)
USA 5.66 (0.06) 7.33 (0.03) 11.83 (0.00)
(b) ... does not Granger-Cause the Price Level
House Prices Output Interest Rate
Australia 3.95 (0.14) 4.92 (0.09) 14.68 (0.00)
Denmark 0.60 (0.74) 6.41 (0.04) 2.66 (0.26)
Finland 0.65 (0.72) 1.50 (0.47) 4.69 (0.10)
France 3.23 (0.20) 1.89 (0.39) 12.32 (0.00)
Germany 2.50 (0.29) 2.87 (0.24) 22.59 (0.00)
Japan 5.25 (0.07) 0.45 (0.80) 32.21 (0.00)
Netherlands 9.36 (0.01) 4.38 (0.11) 9.97 (0.01)
Spain 0.26 (0.88) 6.13 (0.05) 1.06 (0.59)
UK 1.17 (0.56) 4.28 (0.12) 13.27 (0.00)
USA 13.70 (0.00) 1.79 (0.41) 16.47 (0.00)
Results of the Granger-causality tests on the null-hypothesis that one of the three variables in
columns (inflation/house prices, output, interest rate) does not Granger-cause house prices
(panel (a)) and output (panel (b)). The reported numbers are the values of the test statistic
which are under the null χ2−distributed with the number of of degrees of freedom equal to
the number of lags of the VAR-system (here: 2). P-values corresponding to the null of no
Granger-causality are reported in parenthesis.
three countries (Finland, France and Spain). But we find that the inclusion of
house prices have a significant impact in forecasting interest rates in all coun-
tries despite Finland, France and the Netherlands. This strong link between
the housing market and money market rates via the mortgage market was also
found earlier in cross correlations and impluse responses.
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Table 12: Granger-Causality Tests
(c) ... does not Granger-Cause Output
Inflation House Prices Interest Rate
Australia 6.30 (0.04) 1.42 (0.49) 11.98 (0.00)
Denmark 2.26 (0.32) 7.98 (0.02) 5.36 (0.07)
Finland 1.21 (0.55) 23.98 (0.00) 8.91 (0.01)
France 7.22 (0.03) 0.98 (0.61) 21.69 (0.00)
Germany 2.35 (0.31) 2.12 (0.35) 1.54 (0.46)
Japan 3.52 (0.17) 8.79 (0.01) 5.51 (0.06)
Netherlands 0.65 (0.72) 4.11 (0.13) 11.73 (0.00)
Spain 8.09 (0.02) 26.12 (0.00) 4.50 (0.11)
UK 9.19 (0.01) 2.97 (0.23) 18.16 (0.00)
USA 13.30 (0.00) 9.12 (0.01) 21.98 (0.00)
(d) ... does not Granger-Cause Money Market Rate
Inflation Output House Prices
Australia 4.35 (0.11) 4.82 (0.09) 12.32 (0.00)
Denmark 3.70 (0.16) 3.00 (0.22) 20.68 (0.00)
Finland 3.82 (0.15) 6.29 (0.04) 7.57 (0.02)
France 5.52 (0.06) 7.29 (0.03) 3.99 (0.14)
Germany 4.25 (0.12) 44.48 (0.11) 6.85 (0.03)
Japan 14.73 (0.00) 5.77 (0.06) 16.12 (0.00)
Netherlands 0.48 (0.79) 1.58 (0.46) 4.90 (0.09)
Spain 1.36 (0.51) 15.79 (0.00) 11.62 (0.00)
UK 3.35 (0.19) 5.13 (0.08) 12.48 (0.00)
USA 7.31 (0.03) 5.48 (0.06) 7.24 (0.03)
Results of the Granger-causality tests on the null-hypothesis that one of the three variables
in columns (inflation, house prices, interest rate/output) does not Granger-cause output
(panel (c)) and interest rates (panel (d)). The reported numbers are the values of the test
statistic which are under the null χ2−distributed with the number of of degrees of freedom
equal to the number of lags of the VAR-system (here: 2). P-values corresponding to the null
of no Granger-causality are reported in parenthesis.
5 Conclusion and Outlook
Within this paper we wanted to highlight the empirical relevance of the inter-
play between the housing market and key macroeconomic variables like prices,
output and interest rates. For conducting this research goal we employed lots
of econometric methods like analysing cross correlations at different leads and
lags and VAR-based inference like impluse responses, forecast error varaince
decompositions and Granger-causality tests.
Within this paper the follwing results emerge.
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(i) We suspected that a monetary tightening leads to lower real estate prices,
because higher interest rates increase the costs of financing real estate
projects and thereby lower housing demand. We find empirical evidence
for this proposition by finding out that a monetary policy shock low-
ers real house prices in all ten OECD countries. Moreover we found
out that money market rates Granger-cause house prices in France, the
Netherlands, the UK and the USA. In half of the countries considered the
interest rate shock explains between 12 and 24 percent of the fluctuations
in house prices.
(ii a) We expected that an inflationary shock should lead to higher real estate
prices because economic agents rise their demand for real estate in order
to protect their wealth against future inflation. Impulse responses indi-
cate that house price decline in eight of ten countries, while we only find
support of our hypothesis in Denmark and Spain. Forecast error vari-
ance decompositions indicate that only a minor fraction of the volatility
in house prices can be explained by the inflationary shock. Moreover, we
only find for Japan and Spain that prices Granger-cause house prices.
Reasons might be that rent income is not reflected in the OECD house
price indices so the indices only measure the worth of the building as
a consumption good because inflation protection through real estate is
only possible through inflation indexation of rents.
(ii b) We supposed that if prices are rising the monetary authority will respond
by raising their interest rate and thereby increasing the costs of financing
real estate projects. This will result in a decline in housing demand and
thereby in declining house prices. We find empirical support for this
hypothesis because impulse responses indicate that after an inflationary
shock money market rates increase and house prices decline.
(iii) The hypothesis that a shock to output raises households’ income and
thereby their demand for housing and thereby leads to increasing house
prices can be empirically veryfied. Impulse responses indicate that house
prices increase in nine of ten OECD countries after an output shock hit
the economy. Moreover, cross correlations indicate a high correlations
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between the cyclical components of house prices and output at several
leads and lags. Despite this high correlations the house price shock ex-
plains only a small fraction of house price volatility.
(iv) We suspected that a shock to real estate prices leads to an increase
in households’ net worth through which they increase their demand for
consumption goods. This increase in aggregate demand pushes output
above its long-term steady-state level. Impulse responses indicate that
output increases in seven of ten OECD countries after a house price shock
hit the economy. Moreover, we find strong cross correlations between
the cyclical components of house prices and output at several leads and
lags. Furthermore, house prices Granger-cause output in half of the
OECD countries. Forecast error variance decompositions indicate that
a significant fraction of output fluctuations (12 to 20 percent) can be
traced back to housing demand shocks. We conclude that this channel
is empirically relevant.
(v) We supposed that a hike in real estate prices lead to inflationary pres-
sures. Impulse responses indicate that the price level rises in all ten
OECD countries after a housing demand shock. Moreover, we found
that around 10 to 20 percent of the fluctuations in the price level can be
traced back to housing demand shocks in four countries.
(vi a) We supposed that the central bank reacts to a housing price shock by rais-
ing her policy rate because the housing demand shock pushed aggregate
demand. Impulse responses indicate that in seven out of ten countries the
housing demand shock raises both prices and output which means that
it raises aggregate demand. Moreover, the impulse responses indicate
that the central bank reacts to this shock by raising the money market
rate. Forecast error variance decompositions indicate that the housing
demand shock is a key driver of interest rates in eight of ten countries.
Futhermore, we find that house prices Granger-cause the money market
rate in eight of ten countries. Thus, we conclude that this channel is
empirically relevant.
(vi b) We supposed that a rise in real estate prices raises the value of collateral
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which gives incentives to banks to raise their credit supply. Thus interest
rates should fall in response to increasing house prices. We do not find
evidence for this collateral channel because interest rates rise in nine
countries after the house price shock. We conclude that this channel
is only of minor importance and maybe superimposed by the inflation
targeting policy of the central bank (see (via)).
All in all, we find a lot of empirical support that house prices are a key element
of the interplay between macroeconomic variables. A new and robust result is
that unexpected increses or decreases in real house prices can be interpreted as
germane aggregate demand shocks. This result has the following implications
for the conduct of monetary policy. Because unexpected house price changes
lead to changes in aggregate demand they can be used as an indicator of future
inflation. Future research should elaborate on the abbility of real house prices
as an inidcator of demand driven inflation. Further research might also use this
information for building models that connect housing and the macroeconomy
(see Rubio 2007 and Iacoviello and Neri 2008).
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